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Abstract 
In this article we portray the state of technically diverse economies as 
the outcome of probabilistic equilibria. We provide the steady state dis-
tributions of current technologies, unemployment, wages and job durations 
thus allowing the comparison of situations with identical mean values but a 
differently distributed probability mass. A queueing closed network is used 
to establish the connections between advertised, filled and dormant business 
options, and their implications for the unemployment of differently quali-
fied workers. The queueing connecting rates are obtained endogenously as 
the outcome of the optimizing strategies of firms. 
Keywords: Unemployment, probabilistic matching, queues, optimal tech-
nologies. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Technological change has been alternatively blamed or praised for the effect it has 
on unemployment. It seems to be generally agreed that technical progress brings 
an increase in the number of vacancies while bearing in it the demise of antiquated 
methods of production. However in any ecónomy the old and the new ways of pro-
ducing the same type of goods often coexist, a fact that cannot only be accounted 
for by the clinging of old established firms to methods they have always known 
while the more modern entrepreneurs adopt the latest technology, since it often 
happens that newly created firms choose aged but still profitable technologies. 
This seems to contradict the usually assumed fast adaptability to innovations on 
the part of new entrepreneurs. The effect of this simultaneous heterogenei ty of 
production methods makes the interaction between growth and employment quite 
complex since it is not necessarily the case that the best educated workers always 
get the plum jobs in a world where a fast moving technology opens and closes 
labour sectors, but more a matter of firms and workers competing among them-
selves for the adequately qualified partner. The problem of matching wor kers to 
jobs depends on how closely the distribution of labour qualifications among the 
unemployed fits in with the labour requirements of firms. It is the object of this 
article to provide a theoretical framework within which this situation can be fully 
accounted for. 
The article connects with two main lines of research, unemployment and en-
dogenous growth. Given how large both areas are it seems best to start by citing 
only a few articles setting the general framework from which our analysis springs. 
The part of the labour literature that is closest to our work generally takes as 
given the reservation wages and intensity of job search among the unemployed 
and studies how workers are matched to advertised vacancies using a technol-
ogy that changes over time but is generally the same for all coexisting finns. A 
matching function establishing the rate of successful job contacts together with 
a condition equating the flows in and out of unemployment, provide a relation 
between the levels of unemployrnent and advertised vacancies. This together with 
sorne equilibrium conditions relating the costs and benefits of creating new va-
cancies and the supply and demand of human capital, jointly determine the full 
equilibrium of the system. These analyses are generally deterministic in nature 
and, although random Poisson shocks occurring at a known rate might affect the 
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creation or destruction of jobs, the predicted equilibrium levels of unemployment, 
wages and vacancies are described in terms of their expected equilibrium values 
given the nature of the shocks. Two articles in this line are those of Aghion and 
Howitt (1994) and Blanchard and Diamond (1994). The first one analyzes how 
technology shocks simultaneously create and destroy business options thus affect-
ing the reallocation of labour between nascent and dying firms. Blanchard and 
Diamond examine the effect on labour market variables of a preference on the 
part of firms for workers with the shortest unemployment and compares it with 
the effect of no ranking when deciding whom to hire. 
It is usually assumed in the literature either that all workers are alike in qual-
ification or at most that there is a small finite number of qualifications although 
this is sometimes converted into a continuous distribution (see Acemoglu (1997)). 
When formalizing the matching of workers to the technically diverse advertising 
firms we assume that workers vary continuously in qualification and this gives 
them different chances of becoming employed. Sorne authors have considered 
differentiated access of workers to jobs on the basis of the level of qualification 
involved on one or both sides of the hiring. For instance Ours and Ridder (1995) 
consider qualified workers who apply simultaneously for two types of jobs differing 
in the salary offered by each and in the time it takes to find them. This results in 
workers applying for jobs requiring less qualification than they themselves posses. 
We characterize the interval of firms in which each unemployed worker searches in 
terms of the duration of his previous unemployment and of his qualification leve!. 
In consequence each firm ends up having a waiting list of differently qualified job 
applicants from which the candidate most suitable for the job is chosen. Kahn 
(1987) considers that it may be in the interest of firms to offer salary incentives to 
obtain a queue of job applicants since that reduces the cost of educating employed 
labour, but he does not specify the grounds on which job applicants are selected. 
In this article we consider salary incentives as a way to attract better qualified 
job applicants and also to accelerate the matching process of firms to workers. 
We then obtain an ordering of job applicants according to their qualification and 
determine an explicit expression for the expected best labour qualification each 
firm hires. 
We have used probability theory to model the behaviour of the system because 
the levels of unemployment and vacancies in any economy generally vary in a man-
ner that limits the predictive power of a deterministic approach. Our modelling of 
the matching relationship permits the determination of the equilibrium probabil-
ity distributions of unemployment and vacancies thus obtaining an understanding 
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of the behaviour of these variables which goes beyond explanations that only take 
into account their mean values and cannot in consequence compare situations 
where the probability mass around them is very differently distributed. Labour 
markets with very similar initial conditions often differ in actual unemployment 
and vacancies rates. This can be justified by the fact that random exogenous 
shocks periodically alter labour market conditions causing actual market rates 
to differ even though their mean values and underlying probability distribution 
may be the same. In our context the c.ommon mean values can be considered 
as the deterministic solution. We adopt a probabilistic matching function and 
derive a stochastic Beveridge curve accounting for the indeterminate sign of the 
correlation between unemployment and advertised vacancies as reported in Bean 
and Pissarides (1993). The deterministic versions of the matching function and 
Beveridge curve usually employed in the literature can be understood as partic-
ular cases of their stochastic equivalent functions when the random variables of 
unemployment and vacancies are substituted for their corresponding mean values. 
The second main area of research which we lightly touch upon is the area 
of endogenous growth. We too account endogenously for the technical efficiency 
of firms and connect it to unemployment. Aghion and Howitt (1992) consider a 
model where technological shocks together with the value of the employment rate 
in the research sector determines the growth rate of the economy. A system of 
patents ensures the appropriability of rents for a time but innovations are copied 
later on by other firms. Thus different technologies are used simultaneously, a 
feature shared with this article. Eicher (1996) focuses on the interconnections 
between the education decisions of workers and the economic growth resulting 
from their greater ability when employed. Finally, Andolfatto (1996) and Laing, 
Palivos and Wong (1997) link endogenous growth to unemployment by adding a 
matching function to the model. In our article the growth rate is the outcome of 
the endogenous deCisions of firms regarding technology and the choice of appropri-
ately qualified workers. We account for the technical diversity among firms at any 
given time in terms of the optimal waiting it takes to convert technologies that 
were once profitable, which we call dormant vacancies, into profitable ones which 
for a time find a niche in the market. The niches occupied by existing advertising 
firms at any given time might be quite different in technical character and labour 
qualification and also vary in the time they last in business. The fiows resulting 
from the choices made by all firms, and their matching to unemployed workers, 
can be modelled as arrival and departure stochastic processes. Queueing theory 
deals exactly with this problem. We model the economy as a closed Markovian 
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queueing network where the pools of waiting firms and unemployed workers are 
the service areas in the system. We will have three pools representing respectively 
the nodes of advertised, fil!ed and dormant firms. The rate linking the pool of 
advertised vacancies to the pool of fil!ed jobs, and hence employment, is given 
by the matching function, the rate linking the pool of fil!ed jobs to the pool of 
dormant options is the inverse of job durations and the rate linking the pool of 
dormant options to the pool of advertised jobs is the rate at which new firms 
appear in the economy. Al! these rates ~rÉ determined endogenously. We then 
have a stochastic dynamical system whose solution converges to a unique random 
equilibrium associated to a probability distribution which we calculate. 
The article is organized as fol!ows. In section two we set up the queueing 
network describing the system and obtain the stationary probability distributions 
of unemployment and vacancies. In section three we account for the optimal 
behaviour of firms which, together with the characteristics of labour supply, de-
termine the wage and labour qualification distributions in the economy and the 
optimal waiting times associated to the rates linking the pools of the system. In 
the last section we consider sorne extensions of the model. Al! proofs are given in 
the appendix. 
2. QUEUEING NETWORKS 
We consider a closed network of firms and related employment. Each worker 
provides a unit of labour and each operating firm is matched with one worker. 
Firms can be in three alternative positions: advertised, fil!ed with a job appli-
cant and dormant. The time a firm spends at each situation is assumed to be 
exponential!y distributed. A dormant firm is an unprofitable technology that can 
become a profitable one by investing in the right technology and employing the 
appropriate worker. To get the right technology a firm waits an average time )..-1 
after which it advertises a job opening and gets an appropriate candidate after 
waiting an average time f.L-l. If the firm cannot hire a worker within a reasonable 
time, equal on average to ¡-1, the advertised vacancy becomes a dormant one. If 
the firm is able to hire the right worker it starts producing and stays in business 
for a mean time S after which it again becomes dormant. In the next section we 
determine endogenously the rates linking these positions. 
We assume given the total number V of firms, that is 
V = va(t) + V¡(t) + Vd(t), (2.1) 
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where each successive term in the sum represents respectively the number of 
advertised, filled and dormant firms at time t. The size L of the labour force 
is also assumed given and 
L = U(t) + vf(t) (2.2) 
where U(t) represents the total number of unemployed workers at time t and vf(t) 
represents the total number of employed persons since one worker matches with 
one filled firmo The two related networks of firms and workers are given in figure 
1 below. 
lAdvertised firms: va(t) - kI----+ k¡.t ----JFilled firms: v,(t) -iíJ 
mA n/S 
I Dormant firms: Vd(t) = m 
Figure 1.a 
I Unemployed: U(t) = U I ----+ k¡.t ----+ I Employed: vf(t) = n = L - U 
f-- n/S f--
Figure 1.b 
Given (2.1) and (2.2), theanalysisofthestochasticprocessX(t) = (va(t),vf(t)) 
completely characterizes the behaviour of vacancies and unemployment. Since 
the stochastic process X(t) is Markovian and irreducible, with finite state space 
E = {(k, n) E IN x IN : k + n ~ V} , X(t) is ergodic and there exists a unique 
stationary probability distribution {Pkn} , (k, n) E E, 
Pkn = lim Pr [X(t) = (k, n)] 
t~oo 
(2.3) 
with marginal stationary probabilities Pk. and P.n (see Asmussen (1987)). We de-
note by U, Va, Vf and Vd the stationary random variables of unemployment and 
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advertised, filled and dormant vacancies respectively. We determine the probabil-
ity distributions of these variables using the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations that 
characterize an equilibrium by establishing an equality between the probabilities 
of getting in and out of any given state (k, n) E E. These equations have a slightly 
different form depending on whether L > V or L ::; V. We first consider the case 
when L > V, thereby assuming the existence of positive unemployment. The 
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations can be easily obtained with the help of diagram 
1 (see appendix). Theyare 
( n) n+ 1 (, + J1)k +,\ (V - k - n) + S Pkn = --S-Pk,n+1+ 
+,\ (V - k-n + 1) Pk-l,n + J1 (k + 1) Pk+1,n-l +, (k + 1) Pk+l,n (2.4) 
for every (k, n) E E. Note that Pkn = O if k, n < O or k, n > V. This linear system 
has a unique non negative solution satisfying the condition that all probabilities 
sum to unity (see Asmussen (1987)). This solution fully describes the stochastic 
behaviour of unemployment and vacancies in every state. The matching of unem-
ployed labour to advertised vacancies occurs at the random rate J1Va (t) and hence 
the matching function in steady state is given by 
(2.5) 
where Va is a random variable with probability distribution {Pko }o:Sk:SV. We can 
consider the deterministic matching functions used in the literature as particular 
cases of (2.5) when we substitute the random variable Va by its mean value Va. In 
that case average matching would be m(U, va) = J1va, where U is the average level 
of unemployment. Note that although equation (2.5), does not seem to depend 
on the level of unemployment, such dependence wil! be later established through 
the endogenous relation between J1 and U. We can obtain moments of any order 
for all stationary variables using the moment generating function 
( ) ",k=V",n=V-k k n p Z, y = Lk=O Ln=O PknZ Y , (2.6) 
where z, y E [O, 1J. Using this function, equations (2.4) become 
7 
+ (Y ~ 1 + AY(Z -1)) P;(z,y) = O. (2.7) 
If we solve this partial differential equation we get P(z, y) and thus obtain the 
probability distribution {Pkn}. However just to get the moments we only need to 
differentiate (2.7) with respect to z and y at z = y = 1. The first and second order 
moments are given in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. The mean numbel's of ádvertised and lilled vacancies are, 
Va = AVj(A + A¡.tS) 
v¡ = ¡.tSva = A¡.tSVj(A + A¡.tS), 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
IVhere A = A + ¡.t + ,. Also the variances, covariance and correlation coeflicient of 
the tlVO variables are 
_ 2 A (A¡.tS + ¡.t + ,) + A¡.t + J!? 
Var[vaJ = aa = A¡.t (1 + AS) + A (A + S 1) Va (2.10) 
2 ¡.tSA (A + S-1) 
Var[v¡J = a¡ = A¡.t(1 + AS) + A(A+ S 1) Va 
A¡.t (1 + AS) 
Cov[va,V¡J = -A¡.t(1+AS)+A(A+S 1)va 
2 _ A2¡.tS 
PVaVI - A (A¡.tS + ¡.t + ,) 
Proof. See appendix .• 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
Given (2.1) and (2.2), the above mean values allow us to write the mean 
numbers of dormant vacancies and unemployment as, 
Vd = (¡.t +,) Vj(A + A¡.tS) (2.14) 
u = L - ¡.tSva = L - A¡.tSVj(A + A¡.tS). (2.15) 
This relation between U and Va, coincides with the version of the Beveridge curve 
given in Aghion and Howitt (1994) although we need not impose any condition 
on the relative values of the parameters to ensure non negative unemployment. 
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We also have a general steady state relationship between random unemployment 
and the random number of vacancies, namely V = Va + VI + Vd. This is not a 
random Beveridge curve since it does not just give a relationship between random 
advertised vacancies and random unemployment. It also includes the random 
term Vd. The joint probability distribution {Pkn} is the probability distribution 
of a random Beveridge curve. The following linear approximation might be useful 
to get a feeling of the relationship between the variables involved. This simplified 
Beveridge curve is given by, 
U - U _ Cov[va , VI] ( _ - ) 
- Va Va 
aa 
(2.16) 
This relationship provides a positive correlation between unemployment and ad-
vertised vacancies, since the covariance term (2.12) is always negative. However 
there is a monotonically increasing relationship between the mean values of those 
variables as can be seem in (2.15). That is, in probability we have the opposite of 
what is the case in mean in most models in the literature including this one. The 
negative sign of Cov[va , VI] aboye is forced by the fact that in closed networks, 
when the total number V of vacancies is small in relation to the size L of the labour 
force, an increase in the number of advertised firms must be accompanied by a 
larger counteracting effect given by the destruction of filled vacancies, whatever 
the values of the rates involved in the network. The sign of the covariance term 
is opposite to that reported by Andolfatto (1996) for the USo But then it is likely 
that for a large economy L ~ V, a case we wil! analyze later and which wil! in some 
cases confirm the findings of Andolfatto (1996). Observe also that m~asJ < 1 and 
hence the relationship between unemployment and advertised vacancies is never 
linear. Moreover when the destruction rate'Y of advertised vacancies is large, m~asJ 
tends to zero giving linear independence in the limito When 'Y is small and the 
matching parameter ¡¡, is also small the relationship between advertised vacancies 
and unemployrnent is almost linear. As we shall see later a low value of ¡¡, is the 
consequence of slow rate of job applications, which in turn can be the consequence 
of a mismatch between the distribution of technical efficiency in firms and that of 
qualifications among the unemployed. 
When L ~ V the corresponding Chapman-Kolmogorov equations have, when 
n = L, an extra term on the left hand side, given by 
(2.17) 
expressing the probability of zero unemployrnent, or whatever level may be con-
sidered the minimum feasible level of unemployment in the economy. In this case 
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the stationary matching function is 
m(U, Va) = ¡.tVa, if U > O (2.18) 
and zero otherwise. In this case the following proposition holds. 
Proposition 2. The mean numbers oE advertised and fi11ed vacancies and the 
covariance between the two variables are respectively, 
_ .W ,\ V 2pvo + ¡.t (1 + '\S) Va,L (2.19) 
Va = A + '\¡.tS + A + '\¡.tS 
_ '\¡.tSV ¡.tS (W2pVO - (,\ + 'Y) Va,L) (2.20) 
VI = A + '\¡.tS + A + '\¡.tS 
e [ 1 - S'\¡.t (V - W - 1) S'\¡.t ('\S + 'YS + ¡.t (1 + '\S) (S - 1)) Va,L-ov Va, VI - A + '\¡.tS Va+ A + '\¡.tS Va+ 
+ (AS+ ~)EA'\¡Ktp) (W2 (1- '\(1 + AS))pvo - E'Y+'\)s~,i) + 
A¡.tS (L - '\S(L + V - 1)) Va,L (2.21) 
+ (AS + l)(A'\¡.tS) , 
where 
",k=V-L 
Va,L = Lk=l kPkL, 
-2 ",k=V -L ( ) Va,L = Lk=l k k - 1 PkL 
and Pvo is the probability that a11 vacancies are advertised and hence the numbers 
oE dormant and fi11ed vacancies in the economy are both zero. 
Proof. See appendix .• 
When L ::; V, all moments depend on Va,L, s~,i and Pvo, values which could be 
easily but messily found by solving the first order differential equations associated 
to the boundary states of the corresponding Chapman-Kolmogorov equations (see 
diagram 1 in the appendix). The Beveridge relationship among the mean values 
of advertised vacancies and unemployment is 
U = L - S¡.t(va - Va,L). (2.22) 
When V and L are both large enough it is likely that Pvo is close to zero, in 
which case the first term in (2.21) dominates over the other terms and hence 
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when A < 1 this results in a negative correlation between advertised vacancies 
and unemployment. This is so because when A is small and V large there is 
an accumulation of dormant vacancies which eventually come out as advertised 
firms and this, for any J1-, results in lower unemployment since the number of 
newly created jobs is greater than the possible counteracting job destruction. 
The opposite happens when A is large enough. The indetermination in the sign 
of the correlation theoretically accounts for the evidence in regard to growth 
and unemployment reported in Bean and Pissarides (1993) if we identify greater 
growth with large values of A. Note that every case is compatible with a downward 
sloping relationship between the mean values of the deterministic Beveridge curve 
(2.22). 
We have used a matching function J1-Va encompassing parameters chosen by 
firms but we could have used instead a function bU, where b is the rate at which 
the unemployed find jobs. Since in equilibrium the probability of having one extra 
person employed coincides with the probability of having one extra filled vacancy, 
it follows that J1-va = bU. This last equation is used by Laing et al. (1995) to 
characterize the equilibrium of the system and we could use it to find b once the 
values of the other terms are known. Qur choice of the matching function is in 
accordance with the character of the optimization problem accounting endoge-
nously for the rates in the queueing network used in this section and generally 
taken as parameters in the literature. We analyze this next. 
3. OPTIMAL ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISIONS 
We consider a market in steady state composed of firms, workers and the unem-
ployed who are the only job seekers. Individuals differ in qualification and firms 
vary in the technology they use and the corresponding labour qualification they 
demando All jobs require a unit of labour of the appropriate qualification. All 
individuals have a unit of labour at their disposal which, if employed they supply 
inelastically, at the agreed wage, having no regard for leisure. We assume that 
there is only one consumption good per period which is taken to be the numeraire 
commodity. All income elements are expressed in terms of this commodity. In 
this article we do not analyze in detail the search process of the unemployed but 
only assume that employers know both the unemployment benefits and the distri-
bution of unemployment duration of qualified labour. All income and cost terms 
are expressed in terms of their values at time t = O when all decisions are taken. 
We first describe informally the decisions a typical firm optimally takes and 
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relate them to the rates assumed in the queueing network of the previous section. 
We take a dormant option with an inherited unprofitable technology that is con-
sidering how long it will be optimal to wait before it can get the most profitable 
one given the options offered by the state of technical knowledge and its own 
initial position. The longer it waits the more advanced the technology will be 
but the higher will be the cost involved. We assume the distribution of dormant 
technologies to be known and hence we can obtain the average optimal time T; it 
takes a dormant technology to become a profitable one in the economy. The rate 
A in the previous section is then equal to·l/T;. The firm then has to decide how 
long to wait for the optimal candidate having a minimum qualification associated 
to the chosen technology. The longer it waits the better the chance of getting a 
better candidate but the greater is the cost involved since having already chosen 
the technology there is a loss in the relative technical efficiency of the firm as time 
passes. Hence there is an optimal time that each particular firm will wait before 
it hires anyone. Given the distribution of dormant technologies we can determine 
the optimal market mean time T; it takes an advertised firm to become a fil!ed 
one. Then J.L = liT; in the network aboye. Once the right job candidate has 
been found the firm starts production and stays in business for an optimal!y de-
termined time. Given the distribution of dormant technologies, the average time 
firms stay in business in the market is S· and hence the market rate at which firms 
get out of business is l/S'. Just in this section and for simplicity we assume to 
be zero the rate 'Y at which advertised vacancies become dormant because no job 
candidate arrives. We will also determine the optimal labour qualification hired 
by each firm and the salary paid. We first discuss the characteristics of labour 
supply. 
3.1. Labour Supply 
We assume the unemployed labour force has different labour qualifications repre-
sented by a random variable 8 u , with support in [0,1]. Let F(Bu) be the steady 
state distribution function of 8 u • We assume that the unemployed are contin-
uously improving their skills and in consequence their qualification levels are 
changing over time, although their relative distribution remains unchanged. Al! 
individuals maximize the expected discounted utility of consumption over time 
financed by wage 01' unemployment subsidies. An unemployed worker with qual-
ification Bu can send applications to any job requiring a qualification level less 
than or equal to his own, provided the wage offered for a job of length S, is not 
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less than his reservation wage. Although his acceptance or rejection of a job of-
fer would generalIy depend on the job length, we assume for simplicity that alI 
workers think the offered job wil! last forever. If at time t = O an individual 
with qualification Bu has spent a time z, Z€(O,oo) unemployed getting a subsidy 
v(z, Bu), that decreases with z, then after an interval t he would work in a firm 
offering a salary w, growing at rate p(t}, if 
10"" (wp(t) - v(z.+ t, Bu}} dt 2: O 
where p(t} is assumed to be a decreasing function so as to guarantee a positive 
reservation wage. This can be accounted for by the fact that a worker looses part 
of his qualification by accepting a job demanding less qualification than the one 
he possesses. We take z to be a random variable with probability distribution 
B(z, Bu}. Hence, the expected reservation wage at t = O of Bu is, 
(B ) _ Jo
oo Jooo v(z + t, Bu}dtdB(z, Bu} 
WR u - J;" p(t}dt . (3.1) 
Throughout the article we take the values of all variables as referred to t = 
O. \Ve assume that unemployment benefits, and hence reservation wages, are 
increasing in Bu. If a firm requires a qualification level Bv , where v indexes the 
firm, and offers to pay w(Bv}, an unemployed Bu, Bu 2: Bv with wR(Bu} ::; w(Bv} , 
wil! be wil!ing to work for it and also for any other firm requiring a qualification 
level in the interval [B;;', Bu]' where B;;' is the smalIest Bv satisfying wR(Bu} ::; w(Bv}. 
The distribution B(z, Bu} is the outcome of alI factors that together determine the 
probability that a given worker might find employment. Hence elements such as 
the intensity of search on the part of job applicants and the ranking established by 
firms to select workers affect the shape of B(z, Bu}. Blanchard and Diamond (1994) 
consider the effect of selecting the worker with the shortest unemployment spelI 
when choosing whom to hire, and find that this rule increases mean unemployment 
duration. In our context things are complicated by the fact that job searchers have 
a reservation wage that depends on the shape of B(z, Bu} and this can counteract 
the effect of such ranking, as the folIowing example shows. 
Example. Suppose B(z, Bu} is an Erlang distribution, with N steps, mean a and 
density function 
(Na) N zN-le-Naz 
dB(z, Bu) = (N _ 1)! ' 
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where in this example we assume for simplicity that p(t) = exp( -t) and v(z + 
t, (Ju) = vo((J,,) exp( -r¡(z + t)), r¡ > O. Then, 
((J ) _ vo((J,,)(NoY wR " - r¡(r¡ + Na)N 
When N is greater than one, the probability that a worker gets out of unem-
ployment is greater the shorter the time spent in it, which is the probabilistic 
equivalent of the ranking established by Blanchard and Diamond (1994). How-
ever the greater is N the lower is the reServation wage thus inducing workers to 
search in a wider interval of job qualifications. This might counteract the effect of 
ranking on mean unemployrnent duration. In the case of an Erlang distribution 
this is so, since the mean unemployment duration is a constant a-l. When N = 1 
we have an exponential distribution in which case the worker will have a higher 
reservation wage than that corresponding to any other N and will thus only look 
for a job in a smal!er interval of firms than the one he would have looked into 
if he had faced a distribution B(z, (J,,) with larger N. The opposite ranking of 
selecting the worker who has spent the longest spel! unemployed in preference to 
younger workers can be model!ed with a hyperexponential distribution although 
we would still have constant mean unemployment duration. 
3.2. Technology and Labour Demand 
We now describe how a typical dormant firm, which we identify by EJ~, plans 
al! decisions at time t = O when facing the job seeking behaviour we have just 
described. We concentrate first on how it selects the optimal technology with 
which to come out as an advertised position. We assume that a menu of profitable 
technologies is available to each dormant option at any time. The particular 
element in the menu a dormant option EJ~ gets, depends on the time interval TI it 
waits after t = O. By waiting longer al! dormant options obtain menus with more 
elements than were available before. Among the elements of any menu the firm 
selects the one that promises the largest profit and identifies that choice with the 
minimum level of labour qualification (Jv required to operate it. If the value of 
labour qualification hired is greater than the required minimum, it will increase 
the value of output. We assume that the cost of waiting is increasing with time 
and the cost of getting a particular menu is greater the lower the dormant status 
of the firmo 
If an advertised vacancy with qualification (Jv offers a wagew, the expected time 
interval between two consecutive job applications to the same vacancy is assumed 
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to be a random variable with known mean x _ x(Bu, w, U, va). It seems reasonable 
to assume that X depends on w, since firms often use wages as incentives for better 
job applicants who also come at a faster rate than they would if salaries were lower. 
The dependence of x on U and Va is justified since these elements represent how 
tight the market is and hence how easy it is for a firm to find a suitable worker. 
The potential applicants to this vacancy are al! the unemployed with qualification 
B" E [Bu, B~ (w) 1, where the upper bound of the interval is given by the maximum 
qualification of al! unemployed whose reservation wage is wR(Bu) ::; w. Notice that, 
although Bu is the relative labour qualification of the advertising firm at time Tl , 
the mean x does not depend on Tl> since the distribution of relative qualifications 
is assumed constant over time. In the next section we give a particular functional 
form to x, which will help to understand how this term encompasses the supply 
and demand sides of hired labour. 
Al! firms expecting a positive profit must think that they will get a job ap-
plicant having the required minimum qualification. When this happens the firm 
has to decide whether to hire him or to wait a bit longer in the hope of getting a 
more highly qualified worker. We assume that although given the technology the 
firm obtains a greater output per unit of labour the more qualified is that unit, 
it is costly for the firm to wait since the technology already adopted will become 
progressively dated. Hence the firm will wait a time interval T2 after the arrival of 
the first job applicant only if the benefit of so doing exceeds the costo When a firm 
advertises a job and offers a salary w, it faces a pool of potential applicants with a 
qualification distribution F(B"i Bu) = Pr(8u ::; B" I Bu ::; 8" ::; B~), B~ = B~Ew)K 
If the arrival times of applicants to a vacancy are independent and exponential!y 
distributed random variables with mean x, we get the fol!owing proposition. 
Proposition 1. If at time T l , the flow oI job applicants to a vacancy requiring 
a minimum qualilication Bu, O ::; Bu ::; 1, and offering a salary w, w ;::: wR(Bu), 
is exponentially distributed at rate x- l then the best labour qualilication a lirm 
expects to get alter waiting an interval T2 beyond the arrival time oI the lirst 
suitably qualilied applicant is, 
. OM 
- - M loV ( 1 ) B,,=B,,(Bv,w,T2)=Bv - F(BuiBv)exp -(1-F(B"iBv))x-T2 dB" Ov (3.2) 
and B,,(Bv,w, T2) is increasing and concave in T2. 
Proof. See appendix .• 
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Note that proposition 1 provides an explicit formula accounting for the ex-
pected qualification to be hired from the queue of job applicants to an advertising 
vacancy (Jv. Other articles, such as that of Kahn (1987), do not provide any way to 
order this queue and simply assume that having more candidates is always more 
convenient for the firmo 
3.3. Optimal Entrepreneurial Choice 
We now describe the profit maximization problem determining the decisions of 
each firm regarding ((Jv, TI, T2 , w, S). Firms are identified with their latent qualifi-
cation level EJ~K Since we have assumed al! vacancies potentially profitable we are 
assuming a job candidate always arrives at any given firm, and we now say this 
happens at time X. Let To be the time at which production starts, that is To = 
TI + X + T2• The revenue of the firm at time t = To + T, net of labour costs, is 
where Y is the output obtained with the technology (Jv and the optimal labour 
qualification Bu and the second term on the right hand side represents labour 
costs. A way to understand Y is to think of it as the product of three elements, 
ólEEJ~), W((Jv, TI, EJ~) and <I>(B", x + T2). The first one reflects the output that 
would have been produced with the old unprofitable teclmology. The second one 
represents the extra output that can be produced because the technology has 
been updated, and the labour qualification used is the minimum required level 
(Ju = (Jv. The last term reflects the added output because of the mean extra level 
of labour qualification. Of course these three terms do not have to appear in 
this multiplicative form and hence we represent Y in (3.3) as a general function. 
Note that in choosing TI and (Jv the firm selects endogenously the technology and 
the labour qualification to operate it. Both variables are chosen independently 
although the value of (Jv is a relative qualification referred to a time TI. We 
could think of TI as the mean time before an innovation occurs and consider it 
exogenous and a sign of a new firm appearing, as it is often done in the literature, 
or determine endogenously the time elapsing before the right number of shocks 
occur before the firm decides to appear in the market. However this would be 
a simplification of the approach adopted in this article since we do not need to 
specify the rate at which shocks occur. We can now establish a link with the 
endogenous growth literature. If we were to give a functional to the second term 
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1J!(Bv, T¡, B~) in the explanation of the output function, aggregate over aH firms by 
integrating over the existing distribution of technologies and take the derivative 
of the resulting term with respect to time, we would get the endogenous growth 
rate of the economy. 
The wage costs can be understood as foHows. At T¡ the firm would pay w for 
the candidate. But although a job was advertised at T¡, the hired worker did not 
turn up till T¡ +x+ T2 , by which time the qualification demanded at T¡ had a lower 
relative value so that it would have cost less to employ that particular worker if the 
job had been advertised latero The element a* reflects the corresponding difference 
in labour costs. Note that a* is increasing in time and hence decreasing in wage 
since by offering a salary increment the firm faces a lower x and hence has to wait 
less for job candidates. FinaHy there is the element a( T) reflecting the increase 
over time in the cost of human capital. The product of these three elements is 
the totallabour costo AH functions are assumed to be twice differentiable. 
The total profit a firm gets if it starts production at To is 
where CEB~, Bv, T¡) is the cost of incorporating the technology. Hence the firm is 
assumed to solve 
(3.5) 
where Bv E [0,1], T2 ~ O, T¡ ~ O, S ~ O and w ~ wR(Bv). The foHowing conditions 
ensure the existence of a solution to this maximization problem. These conditions 
are 
Al) AH dormant firms are potentiaHy profitable, that is \iB~, 3T¡, 8 > O and é > O 
such that 
R(T¡ + x + T2 + O) - CEB~, Bv, T¡) > O, 
VT2 E [O,é) and W E [wR(Bv),WR(Bv) + 8) and for sorne Bv E [0,1]. 
A2) For all T¡, T2 , Bv and W satisfying (Al), lims~oo R(To + S) < O. 
A3) For aH T¡, Bv and W satisfying (Al), limT2~ll R(To + O) < o. 
A4) For all T¡, T2 and Bv satisfying (Al), liIllw~oo R(To + O) < O. 
A5) For all T2 , Bv, S and w satisfying (Al), limTl~ll IIEB~, Bv, T¡, Bu, w, S) < o. 
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These conditions guarantee the existence of a solution to (3.5), given by 
EB;EB~, U, va), T{EB~, U, Va), T2EB~, U, va), w*EB~, U, va), p*EB~, U, va)). Notice that 
these optimal values depend on the shape of the unemployment qualification dis-
tribution F( Bu) and changing its shape would alter the values of al! endogenous 
variables and among them that of the unemployment figure in the economy. How-
ever the assumption of an invariant F basically implies that, as in the result of 
Ours and Ridder (1995), the continuous improvement in educational levels does 
not affect the unemployment leve!. 
There will general!y be a multiplicity·of solutions (as in Acemoglu (1997)) to 
this problem due to the substitutability among the variables chosen by the firmo 
Of course it is always possible to ensure uniqueness by imposing the appropriate 
conditions on Y, 0"* , O" and C ensuring the strict concavity of n, but the conditions 
are messy and we omit them. If an interior optimum exists, it must satisfy the 
first order conditions, 
SYov = wO";. loS 0"(7" )d7" + Co• 
SYT , = CT, 
SYT2 = WO"T21o
s 
0"(7" )d7" 
SYw - wO"* {s 0"(7" )d7" = 0"* (s 0"(7" )d7" 
w Jo Jo 
R(To+S) = O 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
(3.9) 
(3.10) 
which basically state the equality between the marginal revenue and the marginal 
cost associated to each variable. It may be worth explaining in some detail the 
conditions on the optimal salary and job length. Condition (3.9) states that by 
ofIering a salary increment, the firm is able to employ a better qualified worker who 
brings an extra revenue that, together with the time advantage obtained because 
all candidates arrive sooner, is equal to the marginal increase in wages during the 
total length of the jobo The fifth condition stating that the job ends when the 
revenue net of labour costs goes to zero also provides the typical condition on the 
optimal salary w establishing it as a proportion of output, w = (O"*O"(S))-ly' Note 
also that this value accounts for the outside opportunities of the hired candidate 
(as in Andolfatto (1996)), since they are refiected in the term x the employer 
takes as given and also in the upper bound B~ of the interval determining the 
potential job applicants to the vacancy. Note also that 0";. in (3.6) can have any 
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signo If dF(Ou) is decreasing in Ou, we would have a positive sign indicating that 
it is costly to attempt to hire a worker with a higher qualification. The opposite 
would be true if the density function is increasing. 
If we now assume that the distribution GO( l~) of dormant relative technologies 
at t = O is known, and has its support in the unit interval, the mean market values 
of (O;, Tt, Ti, w', S') are, 
e: (U, va) = l l;El~, U, va)dGO(oe) 
T;(U, va) = l TtEl~, u, va)dGO(Oe) 
T;(U, Va) = l T;El~, U, va)dGO(Oe) + x(e:,w*, u, va) 
w'(U, va) = l w'El~, U, va)ddlEl~) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
(3.15) 
For ease of reference to the rates in the queueing network we represent in (3.13) 
the mean time an advertised vacancy stays open instead of the mean value of Ti. 
We can now go back to the previous section where we obtained the mean values of 
unemployment ((2.15) or (2.22)) and advertised vacancies ( (2.8) or (2.19)) and, 
together with (3.12), (3.13) and (3.15), get the rates A = l/T;, J1 = l/T;, the rate 
at which a vacancy becomes dormant again l/S' and the equilibrium distributions 
of unemployment and vacancies. All rates depend on L, V and the forms of all 
distributions and functions taken as given in the model. Fl'Om (3.11) and (3.14) 
we also get the optimal expected labour qualification and wages in steady state. 
This closes the model. Note that this equilibrium solution is compatible with 
the existence of any number of firms with distinct initial positions but the same 
optimal Ov and T¡, which might pay different salaries to get differently qualified 
workers since there is a degree of substitutability between impl'Oved technology 
and better qualified labour. This might result in different job durations thus 
offering an alternative explanation to the analysis by Stein (1997) accounting for 
the fact that firms differ in their ability to stand stl'Ong technological shocks. 
Note also that once the full equilibrium solution is found, we could take (3.14) 
and substitute U and Va for their actual current values and, given the steady state 
distribution of unemployment and advertised vacancies we have obtained using 
19 
the Chapman-I<olmogorov equations, we would get the corresponding stationary 
distributions of wages, labour qualifications and job durations in the economy, as 
functions of the levels of unemployment and vacancies at any point in time. 
4. EXTENSIONS 
4.1. Open Networks 
In section two we used a c10sed queueing network, with a given number of total 
vacancies V, to represent the behaviour of the labour market. This might be 
thought unduly restrictive since in any economy the number of entrepreneurial 
options seems to be changing all the time. Our queueing network could be changed 
into an open system by considering an infinite number of dormant vacancies and a 
constant rate of advertised ones. This would ensure the ergodicity of the process 
as long as the destruction rate of advertised vacancies because no job candidate 
appears, 'Y, is non zero. If 'Y = O the process X(t) would still be ergo die if L > AS. 
The main results would remain qualitatively the same. The matching function 
and Beveridge curve would be identical to the functional forms given in section 
two for the case L :::; V, although the covariance between advertised vacancies 
and unemployment would always be negative when 'Y = O. 
4.2. Destruction of Vacancies 
The possibility of destroying a vacancy because no job applicant has turned up 
has not been taken into account in the optimization problem described in section 
3.3 since a worker is always assumed to have arrived at t = T¡ + x. This could 
be generalized by substituting x for the corresponding random variable X. In this 
case the firm's profit should take into account the probability that a job applicant 
arrives before a time T when the expected profit of the firm goes to zero, that is 
the firm would maximize, 
rrEB~, Bv , T¡, T2 ,w, S) = f (t R(To + r)dr - CEB~, Bv , T¡)) h(x I X < T)dx-
-C(Be, Bu, T¡) Pr(x > T) 
where now To is defined as the random variable To = T¡ + X + T2 and h(x I X < 
T) is the conditional density of interarrival times between job applicants given 
that someone arrives before the expected benefit goes to zero. In that case the 
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destruction rate 'Y would be given by 'Y = Pr(x > T) jT and correspondingly the 
matching rate would be ¡t = Pr(x :::; T)j(XT + T2), where XT is the conditional 
expectation of someone arriving before T. 
The destruction rate 'Y could be given an alternative interpretation. It could 
be understood as the rate at which workers change jobs. If an employed worker 
decides to move to an advertised job, his old job will become dormant and there 
will be no change in unemployment. The queueing network we used in section 
two would need no modification to account for this although the functional forms 
of ¡t and 'Y would vary to take into accou~t on the job search. 
4.3. An explicit formula for x 
The function x represents what entrepreneurs think about the searching behaviour 
of workers. For any given Ov, the interval of possible job applicants to that vacancy 
can be identified by the qualification interval [lv,l~lK The competition posed by 
firms close in qualification to Ov also partly determine how many job applicants 
arrive to the vacancy Ov. This possible competition can be identified by the 
qualification interval [O:;', l~{lK We have assumed that the wages offered by all 
firms in the economy are known since that is necessary to obtain O:;' and we have 
assumed that each one of them is found optimally given x. This problem can 
be got round by assuming instead that wages are a fixed proportion f3 of the 
output to be produced if the firm would hire a worker with the exact minimum 
qualification Ov, that is, w = f3Y (Oe, Ov, T¡) and then find the optimal value of f3. 
Although in the article we have not modelled searching behaviour explicitly 
it seems reasonable to assume that x is increasing in the mean number of those 
vacancies competing with Ov and decreasing in the mean number of job applicants. 
A plausible formula could be the ratio between the mean numbers of competing 
advertised vacancies and potential job candidates, namely 
where G(Ov) is the qualification distribution of advertised firms. If it were to be 
the case that F and G are both uniform distributions with support in [0,1], then 
x = 'ü (OM - om)jU(OM - O ) av ti ti v' 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Queueing theory can encompass any idea about how the economic relationships 
among agents determine the times they spend at each pool, the transition rates 
among them and the preferences about whom to select from each one. This al!ows 
us to use a probabilistic matching function providing a truly stochastic Beveridge 
curve which permits a more thorough understanding of the labour market than it is 
possible with analyses based on dÉtÉrmini~tic relationships. We have used the idea 
of optimal waiting to determine how firms decide when to appear in the market, 
how long to stay in business and what kind of labour to employ when the steady 
state encompasses a variety of efficient technologies and labour qualifications. In 
this article we have endogeneized the waiting times associated to al! choices the 
firm makes and have incorporated this information within a general queueing 
model thus obtaining, with the aid of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, the 
steady state distributions of unemployment and advertised vacancies which in turn 
provide the corresponding market distributions of optimal labour qualifications, 
wages, technology and job durations. 
Sorne of the possible extensions of this article have been pointed out in the 
last section. But there remain other natural extensions connecting labour market 
analyses with the endogenous growth literature. The most immediate one would 
relate the choice of educational levels on the part of the unemployed with the 
efficiency levels of firms. This could be taken into account within a queueing net-
work by incorporating educational pools and then assuming that entrepreneurial 
preferences about whom to hire first order the queues of the unemployed accord-
ing to educational levels. A more complicated analysis would take into account 
the possibility that the transition rates between pools could depend on the times 
spent at each pool by the agents involved, an analysis that would require the 
use of non Markovian systems. This would be mathematical!y tractable although 
the equilibrium solution would be analytical!y quite complicated and a numerical 
analysis might be in order. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of proposition 2.1. The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations in (2.4) can be 
easily obtained with the fol!owing transition diagram. At a given state (k, n, m), 
1 < k, n, m < V, m = V - k - n, the possible transitions in and out of this state 
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are 
(k,n+ 1,m -1) -> (n+ 1)/8-> -> n/8 -> (k,n -1,m+ 1) 
(k -l,n,m+ 1) -> (m+ 1).\ -> (k n m) 
(k+1,n-1,m)->(k+1)Jl-> " 
-> k'Y -> (k -1,n,m+ 1) 
-> m.\ -> (k+ 1,n,m -1) 
(k+ 1,n,m -1) -> (k+ 1h-> -> kJl-> (k -1,n+ 1,m) 
Diagram 1 
The transition rates are zero if the state from which the system comes (or where it 
arrives to) does not belong to E. We identify (k, n, V - k - n) with (k, n). Taking 
derivatives in (2.7) with respect to z at the point z = y = 1 and with respect to 
y at the same point we get 
Jl8m~E1, 1) =m~E1, 1) 
AV P(1, 1) - (.\z + Jl + 'Y)m~E1, 1) - K\m~E1, 1) = O. 
Note that P(1, 1) = 1, m~E1, 1) = Va and m~E1, 1) = Vf. Then, the first order 
moments follow. Differentiating twice in zz, yy and zy at the point z = y = 1 we 
get 
K\m~E1, 1) + (.\ + Jl + 'Y)m~~E1, 1) + K\m~~E1, 1) = Asm~E1, 1) 
8J1~óE1,1) =Jl~óE1,1) 
(.\ + Jl + 'Y)m~~E1, 1) + K\m~E1, 1) + (.\ + 8-1) m;~E1, 1) = Jlm~~E1, 1) + Asm~E1, 1). 
Given that, m~~E1, 1) = E[v~] - Va, P;y(1, 1) = E[vJ] - Vf and m;~E1, 1) = E[vavf], 
the second order moments and correlation coefficíent follow easily .• 
Proof of proposition 2.2. The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations can be ob-
tained as in aboye proposition but taking into account the term (2.17). In this 
case the moment gimerating function is 
( ",k=V-L ",n=L k n ",k=V ",n=V-k k n P Z, y) = Lk=O Ln=O PknZ Y + Lk=V-L+1 Ln=o PknZ Y . 
In this case the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations given in (2.4) and including the 
new term (2.17), become 
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AV P(z, y) + ((y - 1) 8-1 + Ay (z -1)) m~Ez, y)+ 
+ ((-r + AZ) (z - 1) + fl (z - y)) P;(z, y) = 
AVzv (z -l)pvo + flyL (z - y) i::~Ji kPk,LZk- 1 
Proceeding as we did in proposition 2.1, the results follow .• 
Proof of proposition 3.1. Let e o be the qualification level of the first applicant. 
Denote by e i the qualification of the ith applicant arriving after the first one did. 
Let É~ be the qualification level hired by the firm if it gets n applicants after the 
first one. Hence, É~f = max{eo, el, ... e n }. Since e o, el> ... e n are independent 
and identically distributed random variables, the mean labour qualification hired 
by an advertising vacancy at TI when, demanding a minimum labour qualification 
Bv , offers a salary w and gets n applicants, is 
Since job applicants arrive following a Poisson distribution at rate x-1 , the qual-
ification a firm expects to get from the best applicant if it waits T2 after the first 
arrival is 
Taking derivatives with respect to T2 this function is shown to be increasing and 
concave .• 
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